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THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND 
INNOVATION ACT: IS A GENERIC MARKET FOR 
BIOLOGICS ATTAINABLE? 
KASEY E. KOBALLA? 
ABSTRACT 
 The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 
(BPCIA) provides an abbreviated approval pathway for biological 
therapeutic products shown to be biosimilar to an FDA-approved 
biological reference product. The BPCIA purported to reduce the 
price of biologics while promoting innovation. In two recent cases, 
the Federal Circuit interpreted a key provision of the BPCIA re-
quiring an applicant to provide the reference product sponsor with 
notice 180 days before marketing the product. The Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation extends the exclusivity period already provided for 
the reference product sponsor, deterring innovation and price reduc-
tion. Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one of the cases. 
 This Note will examine provisions of the BPCIA, discuss 
the two recent Federal Circuit decisions, offer an interpretation of 
the relevant BPCIA provisions and a proposed stance on the issues 
before the Supreme Court, and explain how the current interpre-
tation impairs the potential for a generic market for biologics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Biopharmaceuticals, which may be referred to as biolog-
ics,1 are a form of medical treatment manufactured in living 
systems, including plants, animals, and microorganisms—
differing from drugs manufactured through chemical processes.2 
In chemical drug manufacturing, the manufacturing process is 
ordered and resistant to change; however, with biologics, “the 
product is the process.”3 The processes are sensitive to minor 
changes.4 Due to this, “[m]any [biopharmaceuticals] are pro-
duced using recombinant DNA technology” and process controls 
are specific to manufacturers, increasing the difficulty for a sec-
ond manufacturer to replicate the product without knowing the 
exact process used.5 Combined with the complexity of biologics, 
these processes make it difficult to ensure that a follow-on prod-
uct is as safe and effective as the reference product.6 While the 
“bioequivalence of a generic drug” can be established through 
blood level testing or other analyses, the therapeutic equivalence 
of a biologic can only be proven through clinical trials, and ther-
apeutic equivalence is required for biological products.7 
                                                                                                            
 
1 See Ronald A. Rader, What Is a Biopharmaceutical?, BIOEXECUTIVE INT’L 
60, 64 (Mar. 2005), http://www.biopharma.com/bioexecutive_article_pt1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SV37-7YQW]. 
2 How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANI-
ZATION, https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ [https:// 
perma.cc/USE7-WHAZ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
3 Id. The “product is the process” because the biologics are made through a 
live system. Id. The product can be a living entity such as a cell or tissue and 
is composed of nucleic acids, proteins, or other natural components. Id. (refer-
ring to the process of making biologics). 
4 See id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. This differs from chemical drugs where it is easy for manufacturers to re-
verse engineer a chemical compound to make a generic product. See generally id. 
7 Id. To be therapeutically equivalent, the drug must be both bioequivalent 
and pharmaceutically equivalent. Id. Drugs are bioequivalent if “the rate and 
extent of absorption of the test drug do not show a significant difference from 
the rate and extent of absorption of the reference drug when administered at 
the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental 
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses.” Nomenclature (as excerpted 
from the Orange Book), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2, https://www.fda.gov/ohrms 
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 Biologics have proven effective in treating chronic condi-
tions, such as multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, and cancer.8 
However, the production processes make biologic some of the most 
expensive drugs available.9 “In 2013, biologics comprised 28 percent 
(roughly $92 billion) of U.S. drug spending, an increase of nearly 
10 percent since 2012 ...,”10 and based on past trends, this per-
centage will likely continue to increase.11 
 In an effort to reduce the costs of biologics and provide phar-
maceutical manufacturers with initiatives to strive continuously 
for innovation in biological therapies, President Barack Obama 
signed into law the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2009 [hereinafter referred to as the BPCIA] as part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.12 To balance innovation 
and inventor interests, the BPCIA provides a twelve-year exclu-
sivity period for a reference biologic product, preventing follow-on 
biologics (or biosimilars) from entering the market during this 
period.13 Conversely, the BPCIA stimulates accessibility by de-
lineating an abbreviated pathway for biosimilar manufacturers to 
obtain a license for marketability after the exclusivity period ends.14 
                                                                                                            
/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4137B1_07_Nomenclature.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/E8B6-LZKQ]. Further, “[d]rug products are considered to be therapeutic equiva-
lents only if they are pharmaceutical equivalents and if they can be expected 
to have the same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to patients 
under the conditions specified in the labeling.” Id. at 1. “Drug products are con-
sidered pharmaceutical equivalents if they contain the same active ingredient(s), 
are of the same dosage form, route of administration and are identical in strength 
or concentration ....” Id. 
8 Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Leg-
islation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics 
in the United States, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 555, 557 (2008). 
9 See Alex Brill, The Economic Viability of a U.S. Biosimilars Industry, MATRIX 
GLOBAL ADVISORS 4 (Feb. 2015), http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/460582 
/25983845/1424796699187/MGA_biosimilars_2015_web.pdf?token=lc7oFKdV%2
Bh2Y1RuuLiIHvc%2BQETc%3D [https://perma.cc/Q26X-J4X6]. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See generally Ude Lu, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: 
Striking a Delicate Balance Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 613 (2014). 
13 Id. at 613. 
14 Id. at 614. A biological product is biosimilar to a reference product if it is 
“highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in 
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However, many provisions of the BPCIA remain unclear as to 
whom the requirements apply.15 
 In 2015, the Federal Circuit decided Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz 
Inc. [hereinafter referred to as Amgen v. Sandoz],16 interpreting a 
provision of the BPCIA that requires an applicant seeking a license 
for a biosimilar to give the reference product sponsor at least 180 
days advance notice of the first commercial marketing of its bio-
similar.17 The Court held that the applicant must provide notice 
after the biosimilar is approved for marketing by the FDA when 
the 180-day clock will start to run.18 In another recent decision, 
Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc. [hereinafter referred to as Amgen v. 
Apotex], the Federal Circuit interpreted the 180-day requirement 
under a different factual basis, and further, limited the rights of the 
applicant by requiring notice 180 days before marketing, despite 
that the applicant provided the reference sponsor with manufac-
turing information to streamline any necessary patent disputes.19 
This Note discusses how the 180-day notice requirement should 
be interpreted and applied since the requirement is central to both 
Federal Circuit decisions and extends the exclusivity period for a 
reference product.20 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the BPCIA.21 
Part II discusses Amgen v. Sandoz,22 and Part III explains the 
                                                                                                            
clinically inactive components,” if both products utilize the same mechanism(s) 
of action, and if the “route of administration, the dosage form, and the strength 
of the biological product are the same as those of the reference product.” 42 
U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa), (IV) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
15 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
16 See Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1347. 
17 See id. at 1347–48; 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(8)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017) 
(referencing a license allowing the biosimilar to enter the market and compete 
with the reference product). 
18 See Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1358. 
19 See Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d at 1066 (explaining where the applicant dis-
closed information pursuant to provisions of the BPCIA, but did not provide 
notice 180 days before commercial marketing). 
20 See generally id.; Sandoz, 794 F.3d. at 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also infra 
Part IV. 
21 See infra Part I. See generally 42 U.S.C.A § 262(k)–(l) (West 2015) 
(amended 2017). 
22 See infra Part II. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
2018] BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION 485 
holding in Amgen v. Apotex.23 Part IV provides an interpretation 
of the 180-day requirement and the most efficient way to apply 
it while balancing property rights with innovation.24 More spe-
cifically, Part IV will discuss how the Federal Circuit’s interpre-
tation of the 180-day notice requirement of the BPCIA is flawed 
because the BPCIA expressly provides remedies if an applicant 
does not comply with the requirement.25 This Part will also dis-
cuss the proper remedy when an applicant fails to comply with 
the BPCIA requirements.26 Part V will discuss how the Supreme 
Court should address the issues presented in the cross-petitions 
for certiorari filed in Amgen v. Sandoz27 and, following the anal-
ysis in Part IV, why the Supreme Court should rule in favor of 
Sandoz and interpret the 180-day requirement in light of other 
provisions in the BPCIA and the policy concerns behind the Act.28 
Further, Part V will discuss how the suggested interpretation of 
the issues will affect the holdings in both Amgen v. Sandoz and 
Amgen v. Apotex.29 Lastly, Part VI will discuss the efficacy of the 
BPCIA.30 There are many foreseeable problems within the Act31 
and few biologics have entered the market since 2009.32 The 
                                                                                                            
 
23 See infra Part III. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 
1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
24 See infra Part IV. See generally infra text accompanying notes 139–80. 
25 See infra Part IV; see, e.g., Brief for Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of the Petition for Certiorari, at 11, Amgen Inc. v. 
Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (2016) (No. 16-332) [hereinafter Brief for Mylan]. 
26 See infra Part IV; Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 7–9. 
27 See infra Part V. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. and Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 582 U.S.___ (2017) 
(Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4470 [hereinafter Brief for 
the United States]. 
28 See generally id. 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 241–48. 
30 See generally infra text accompanying notes 298–325. 
31 Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Po-
tential Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 215, 215 (2015). 
32 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, List of Licensed Biological 
Products with (1) Reference Product Exclusivity and (2) Biosimilarity or Inter-
changeability Evaluations to Date, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda 
.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandap
proved/approvalapplications/therapeuticbiologicapplications/biosimilars/ucm5
49201.pdf. 
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BPCIA also raises antitrust concerns,33 affects areas of intellec-
tual property,34 and has delayed the entry of generics into the 
market.35 Similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, which has been 
amended to minimize loopholes or decrease generic drug approval 
times,36 the BPCIA needs clarification from the Supreme Court to 
reduce the costs of biologics and provide pharmaceutical manu-
facturers with stronger incentives to innovate.37 
I. THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT 
 The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 
established a pathway for biosimilars to enter the market and com-
pete with reference biological products to balance consumer in-
terests with innovation.38 The BPCIA provides two pathways for 
a biological product to compete with a reference product: either as 
a biosimilar or an interchangeable.39 As their name indicates, 
interchangeable products can be used interchangeably with the 
reference product, and thus have more stringent requirements to be 
eligible for interchangeability status after their development.40 The 
BPCIA provides the reference product with an exclusivity period 
and contains other provisions that balance competitive interests and 
inventive concerns, including the 180-day notice requirement.41 
A. Licensure as a Biosimilar or Interchangeable 
 The pathway established by the BPCIA allows applicants to 
submit an application for licensure of biological products as either a 
                                                                                                            
 
33 Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Ge-
neric Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 558 (2016). 
34 Id. 
35 See id. at 559. 
36 Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping 
the Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), http:// 
www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplement0
809/generic-hatchwaxman-0809 [https://perma.cc/66WC-FHWK]. 
37 See generally infra text accompanying notes 265–75. 
38 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001 
(b), 124 Stat. 119, 804 (Mar. 23, 2010). 
39 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
40 Id. 
41 See generally id. § 262(k)–(l). 
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biosimilar or an interchangeable product.42 In the application, the 
applicant must include information to prove that the biological 
product is biosimilar to the reference product.43 This biosimilarity 
must be based on data derived from animal studies, clinical studies, 
and analytics studies showing “that the biological product is bio-
similar to the reference product.”44 The applicant must demonstrate 
that both biological products utilize the same mechanism for the 
condition(s) of use prescribed in the proposed labeling and that 
those condition(s) of use have been approved for the reference prod-
uct.45 The route of administration, dosage form, and strength must 
be the same as the reference product.46 The applicant must also 
show that the manufacturing facility will be safely maintained.47 
 Demonstrating in lieu of determining eligibility for inter-
changeability (where a biosimilar product can be used interchange-
ably with the reference product) as opposed to biosimilarity (where 
the biosimilar produces the same result in the same way),48 the 
applicant must meet higher safety standards.49 The information 
submitted must show that the biological product is a biosimilar 
and can be expected to produce the same result.50 Additionally, 
if the product is to be administered multiple times a day, the ap-
plicant must show that any risk associated with alternating or 
switching between the interchangeable biosimilar and the refer-
ence product is not greater than any risks associated with using 
the reference product alone.51 
 Generally, an application for a biological product may only 
be evaluated against one reference product, and the Food and 
                                                                                                            
 
42 Id. § 262(k)(1). 
43 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II)–(III). 
46 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(IV). 
47 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V). 
48 Edward Li, Biologic, Biosimilar, and Interchangeable Biologic Drug Prod-
ucts 6–7 (2016) (background paper prepared for the Am. Pharmacists Ass’n Pol’y 
Committee), https://www.pharmacist.com/sites/default/files/files/Biosimilar%20 
Policy%20Background%20Paper%20-%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/TKW4 
-R6U3]. 
49 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(4) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
50 Id. § 262(k)(4)(A). 
51 Id. § 262(k)(4)(B). 
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Drug Administration must review the application.52 Additionally, 
the risk evaluation and mitigation strategies under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which apply to reference biological 
products, shall apply to the biosimilars licensed under the BPCIA.53 
B. Exclusivity for Interchangeable and Reference Products 
 If an application for a biosimilar relies on the same refer-
ence product for which a prior biological product has received a 
determination of interchangeability, the first interchangeable prod-
uct has exclusivity for at least a year.54 The Secretary of Health 
and Human Services (Secretary) cannot make a determination 
until the earlier of: (i) one year after the first commercial mar-
keting of the first interchangeable product,55 (ii) eighteen months 
after either a final court decision on all patents in suit in an action 
against the applicant of the first interchangeable product or a 
dismissal of the action,56 (iii) forty-two months after the approval 
of the first interchangeable if the applicant was sued under sub-
section (l)(6) and the litigation is ongoing,57 or (iv) eighteen months 
after approval of the first interchangeable product if there has 
been no action under subsection (l)(6).58 
 In addition to exclusivity for the first interchangeable, the 
reference product has a substantial exclusivity period.59 The 
applicants cannot submit an application for a biosimilar product 
until four years after the date on which the reference product 
was first licensed,60 and the approval of the biosimilar or inter-
changeable cannot be made effective until twelve years after the 
date on which the reference product was first licensed.61 
                                                                                                            
 
52 Id. § 262(k)(5)(A)–(B). 
53 Id. § 262(k)(5)(C); see 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(p) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
54 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(6) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
55 Id. § 262(k)(6)(A). The Secretary makes the decision of whether a biosimilar 
can be used interchangeably with the reference product. Id. 
56 Id. § 262(k)(6)(B). 
57 Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i). 
58 Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii). 
59 Id. § 262(k)(7). 
60 Id. § 262(k)(7)(B). 
61 Id. § 262(k)(7)(A). 
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C. Provisions Implicated in Amgen v. Sandoz and Amgen v. Apotex 
 To allow the reference product sponsor to prepare for liti-
gation (and limit a “race to the court”), the BPCIA provides that 
the applicant “shall” disclose to the reference sponsor the appli-
cation submitted for approval and, thereafter, a list of patents 
by which the applicant believes a claim of infringement could be 
asserted.62 This allows the reference product sponsor to bring an 
action for infringement if necessary, and allows the reference 
product sponsor to control whether or not there is litigation.63 
 If the applicant discloses under the requirements of (l)(2)(A) 
[hereinafter referred to as (2)(A)], the reference product sponsor 
cannot bring an action for a declaration of infringement, validity, 
or enforceability on any of the patents disclosed by the applicant 
or the reference product sponsor in the disclosure proceedings prior 
to FDA-approval.64 However, if the applicant fails to comply 
with the disclosure proceedings, the reference product sponsor 
can bring any of those actions.65 
 Under subsection (l)(8) of the BPCIA, the applicant is re-
quired to provide notice to the reference product sponsor no later 
than 180 days before the date that the biological product will be 
marketed commercially.66 If an applicant complies and after the 
reference product sponsor receives such notice, the sponsor may 
seek a preliminary injunction before the date of the first com-
mercial marketing of the product.67 This will prohibit the appli-
cant from “engaging in the commercial manufacture or sale of 
such biological product until the court decides the issue of patent 
validity, enforcement, and infringement ....”68 This is applicable 
to any patent that is or is not included in the list provided by the 
reference product sponsor or the applicant.69 
                                                                                                            
 
62 Id. § 262(l)(2)–(3). 
63 Id. § 262(l)(2)–(7). 
64 Id. § 262(l)(9)(A). 
65 Id. § 262(l)(9)(B). 
66 Id. § 262(l)(8)(A). 
67 Id. § 262(l)(8)(B). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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 Once the sponsor seeks a preliminary injunction, the parties 
are expected to reasonably cooperate to expedite any necessary 
discovery in connection with the preliminary injunction motion.70 
However, if the applicant fails to comply with the notice require-
ment of subsection (l)(8), subsection (l)(9)(B) [hereinafter referred to 
as (9)(B)] allows the reference product sponsor to bring an action 
for a declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceability against 
any patents the applicant discloses or that the applicant recently 
received.71 This furthers the goal of expediting entry of the bio-
similar into the market and is central to the two recent Federal 
Circuit cases discussed in the following two sections of this Note.72 
II. AMGEN V. SANDOZ: 180-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
WITHOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 The BPCIA provides an abbreviated pathway to negotiate 
disputes over biosimilars limiting patent litigation.73 This creates a 
“temporary safe harbor from declaratory judgment actions.”74 If a 
party fails to participate in negotiation proceedings, the opposing 
party may commence a patent litigation action.75 These negotia-
tion proceedings are textually distinct from the 180-day notice 
requirement in subsection (l)(8)(A) [hereinafter referred to as 
(8)(A)]; however, this case presents a nexus between the two.76 
A. District Court Decision 
 In July 2014, Sandoz GmbH applied to the FDA to receive 
biosimilar status for its filgrastim product, similar to Amgen’s 
biologic product under the brand-name Neupogen.77 Plaintiffs, 
                                                                                                            
 
70 Id. § 262(l)(8)(C). 
71 Id. § 262(l)(9)(B). 
72 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
73 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at *1. 
76 Id. at *2. 
77 Id. at *1; see Neupogen: Uses, Dosage & Side Effects, DRUGS.COM (July 25, 
2016), https://www.drugs.com/neupogen.html [https://perma.cc/TD2W-RC5H] 
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collectively “Amgen,” asserted that Sandoz behaved unlawfully 
for two reasons: 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) by choosing to not 
engage in the disclosure and dispute resolution process, and 2) by 
intending to market its biosimilar immediately upon approval 
from the FDA, rather than waiting 180 days after providing notice 
to Amgen.78 While Sandoz did not dispute that it failed to engage 
in the resolution process, it asserted that it had the right to do so.79 
 The District Court held that the most reasonable interpre-
tation of (l)(8) favored Sandoz.80 The BPCIA, under the District 
Court’s interpretation, provides that “[i]f both parties wish to 
take advantage of its disclosure procedures, then they ‘shall’ follow 
the prescribed procedures.”81 However, Sandoz did not take ad-
vantage of the disclosures, which the Court claims would have 
been to its benefit.82 These procedures are only “required” when 
the parties “elect to take advantage of their benefits” and are not 
required when the party fails to do so.83 
 Therefore, the Court ruled that it was not unlawful for 
Sandoz to give Amgen notice of commercial marketing 180 days 
before receiving full FDA-approval.84 According to Amgen’s in-
terpretation of the statute, an extra six months of exclusivity 
would have been tacked on to the twelve years Amgen already 
can enjoy.85 Furthermore, Amgen requested a preliminary in-
junction under the belief that Sandoz unlawfully failed to pro-
vide notice 180 days before commercial marketing.86 However, 
this claim was denied as the Court found Sandoz’s actions law-
ful, and Amgen’s claims for unfair competition and conversion 
were dismissed without prejudice.87 
                                                                                                            
(stating Neupogen is a form of protein that stimulates the growth of white blood 
cells in your body. It is used to treat neutropenia (a lack of certain white blood 
cells) caused from cancer and by receiving chemotherapy). 
78 Sandoz Inc., 2015 WL 1264756 at *5. 
79 Id. at *2. 
80 Id. at *7. 
81 Id. at *6. 
82 Id. at *9. 
83 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2015 WL 1264756, at *6. 
84 Id. at *8. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at *9. 
87 Id. 
492 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:479 
B. Federal Circuit Decision 
 Amgen appealed the final decision and the denial of the 
preliminary injunction to the Federal Circuit.88 When presented 
with the same arguments as the District Court, the Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that, when “read in isolation, the ‘shall’ provision 
in [sub-subsection] (2)(A) appears to mean that a subsection (k) 
applicant is required to disclose ...” the information specified in 
the statute. The Federal Circuit further found that the BPCIA 
refers to this information as “required” in other sections of the 
BPCIA.89 The BPCIA, contemplating that the applicant may fail 
to disclose, sets forth a consequence allowing the reference product 
sponsor to commence an infringement action.90 This bars the appli-
cant from bringing a declaratory action on patents that claim the 
biological product.91 However, the Federal Circuit found that 
Sandoz did not violate the BPCIA because this was expressly 
contemplated in the BPCIA.92 
 The Federal Circuit further determined that Sandoz may 
not satisfy its obligation to provide notice to the sponsor before 
the FDA licenses its product.93 Rather, the applicant may only 
give effective notice after the FDA has licensed its product,94 and 
Sandoz did not comply with this requirement.95 The Court de-
termined that the “shall” provision in (8)(A) is required because 
it “presumptively signals a statutory requirement.”96 The BPCIA 
allows noncompliance with the disclosure provisions; however, the 
Court held that nothing in the BPCIA indicates that the appli-
cant is not obligated to give the sponsor notice of commercial 
marketing.97 Therefore, Sandoz may not market the product before 
180 days from the date of notice of FDA-approval.98 The Court 
                                                                                                            
 
88 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
89 Id. at 1355. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1356. 
92 Id. at 1357. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1358. 
96 Id. at 1359. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1360. 
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entered an injunction to prevent Sandoz from marketing, sell-
ing, or importing the product.99 Because the District Court had 
rendered a decision, the Federal Circuit held that the appeal from 
the denial of the preliminary injunction was moot and dismissed 
that aspect of the appeal.100 
C. Supreme Court Response 
 Following the Federal Circuit decision, Sandoz petitioned for 
a writ of certiorari.101 Consequently, Amgen filed a cross-petition 
for certiorari.102 The issues presented in Sandoz’s petition were 
whether notice given before FDA-approval of the biosimilar ap-
plication is legally effective, and if not, whether the notice require-
ment may be enforced by an injunction that delays the marketing of 
the biosimilar until 180 days after FDA-approval.103 The questions 
presented in Amgen’s cross-petition were whether sub-subsection 
(2)(A) of the BPCIA is a required disclosure obligation that may 
be enforced by an injunction or whether the only recourse for 
failure to disclose under (2)(A) is to commence immediate litiga-
tion for patent infringement.104 
 In response, the Supreme Court called for the views of the 
Solicitor General regarding the petitions for certiorari in Amgen 
v. Sandoz.105 The Solicitor General’s brief expressing the views 
of the United States is intended to help the Supreme Court de-
cide if the lower decision should be reviewed.106 The Solicitor 
General recommended granting certiorari and reversing some of 
the holdings.107 The Solicitor General did not agree that the 
premarketing 180-day notice cannot be given until the biosimi-
lar application has been approved by the FDA.108 
                                                                                                            
 
99 Id. at 1360–61. 
100 Id. at 1362. 
101 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 2016 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 731 (No. 15-1039), at i?ii. 
102 Id. at 859. 
103 Id. at 67a. 
104 Id. at 77a?79a. 
105 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2501 (June 20, 2016). 
106 Brief for the United States, supra note 27. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 7–8. 
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D. District Court Decision on Remand 
 Following the issuance from the Federal Circuit, the par-
ties agreed to lift the stay and Amgen asserted a claim of patent 
infringement, which the lower court faced on remand.109 The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California con-
strued the claims to determine if Sandoz infringed Amgen’s as-
serted patent.110 The Court then sent the case for further Case 
Management Strategies.111 
III. AMGEN V. APOTEX: 180-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
WITH THE “PATENT DANCE” 
 Like the discussion of Amgen v. Sandoz in the prior section 
of this Note, the dispute in Amgen v. Apotex arose from conflicting 
interpretations of the 180-day notice requirement of (8)(A).112 
There are factual distinctions in the two cases, but based on the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretations, the cases are legally the same 
as the rights of the reference product sponsor are extended.113 
While Sandoz did not disclose its biosimilar application pursuant 
to the requirement in (2)(A), Apotex participated in the “patent 
dance”114 and complied with the disclosure requirements.115 
                                                                                                            
 
109 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741-RS, 2016 WL 4137563, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2016). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at *19. Case Management Strategies allow the parties to meet and 
decide if they will agree to settle the case, such as through an alternative dispute 
resolution method, or if they would like to proceed to trial. See generally Joint 
Case Management Statement, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. and Sandoz Inc. v. 
Amgen Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02581-RS (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016). 
112 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
113 Id. 
114 The “patent dance” refers to the disclosure requirements outlined in 
262(l). See Connie Ding, Biologics and ‘patent dance,’ LEXOLOGY, Aug. 23, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a2acb833-6b80-483c-91fa-63 
aeb87dd9b9 [https://perma.cc/Y5S8-E9YH]. The subsection provides a schedule by 
which the applicant and reference sponsor exchange information regarding 
the applicant for the biosimilar to help streamline litigation. See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 262(l) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
115 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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A. District Court Decision 
 Like Amgen and Sandoz, Apotex manufactures biologic 
therapies.116 Amgen asserted patent claims against Apotex based 
upon Apotex’s application for FDA-approval to market a biosimilar 
version of Amgen’s pegylated filgrastim product, Neulasta.117 The 
parties disputed terms in the patents asserted, and the Florida 
Southern District Court construed the claims.118 The District Court 
then preliminarily enjoined Apotex from entering the market until 
it gives Amgen notice after receiving the license and waits 180 
days, following the holding in Amgen v. Sandoz.119 
B. Federal Circuit Decision 
 The appeal to the Federal Circuit did not involve the merits 
of the infringement allegations at the District Court.120 Rather, 
it delved into the action brought under the BPCIA.121 Amgen al-
leged that Apotex’s proposed marketing would infringe Amgen’s 
patent.122 Amgen moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit 
Apotex from launching the product into the market once it re-
ceived FDA-approval.123 
 Apotex failed to give notice 180 days before commercially 
marketing its FDA-licensed product; therefore, Amgen sought a 
preliminary injunction to enforce the provision.124 Apotex argued, 
that unlike Sandoz, it launched the statutory process for exchanging 
patent information and channeling patent litigation, and thus, a 
different result was required.125 However, the Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                            
 
116 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 15-61631-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2016 
WL 1375566, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2016). 
117 Id. (stating that “Neulasta and Neupogen are, in the simplest of terms, 
biologic therapies which consist of bacterial proteins that stimulate produc-
tion of white blood cells in patients undergoing chemotherapy and/or stem 
cell transplants”). 
118 Id. at *5–6. 
119 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
120 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
121 Id. 
122 See id. at 1054. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Apotex engaged in the “patent dance.” Id. 
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affirmed the decision from the District Court, holding that “the 
(8)(A) requirement of 180 days’ post-licensure notice before com-
mercial marketing ... is a mandatory [requirement] enforceable 
by [an] injunction whether or not (2)(A) notice was given.”126 The 
Federal Circuit interpreted the word “shall” in (8)(A) to mean 
that the directive is mandatory and concluded that there is no 
language indicating the notice is dependent on whether the ap-
plicant took the earlier step of giving notice under (2)(A).127 
 Apotex further believes that, under this interpretation, the 
(8)(A) requirement would effectively extend the twelve-year exclu-
sivity period by six months.128 However, the Federal Circuit held 
that this is consistent with the exclusivity period in § 262(k)(7).129 
Section 262(k)(7) establishes the twelve-year date as a minimum, 
and as the earliest date on which a biosimilar license can take 
effect.130 Therefore, the court held that even when entry is de-
layed under (8)(A), it is consistent with the exclusivity period, 
and as time goes, this will become less of an issue.131 
 Apotex further argued that the exclusive remedy for viola-
tions of (8)(A) should be a declaratory judgment under (9)(B).132 
(9)(B) permits a declaratory judgment action on a patent if the 
applicant “fails to complete” any of the several steps required by 
the statute, including (8)(A) notice.133 However, the court con-
cluded that this is not the exclusive remedy because (9)(B) states 
“that, in certain circumstances, the reference product sponsor 
‘may bring’ such an action,” and there is no language excluding 
                                                                                                            
 
126 Id. at 1060–61 ((2)(A) notice is the notice requirement to launch the in-
formation-exchange process to expedite a patent infringement suit) (alteration in 
quotation). 
127 Id. at 1061. 
128 If the applicant cannot enter the market until 180 days after market 
approval, despite that the reference product sponsor has knowledge of the product, 
the exclusivity period is extended. Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1061–62 (stating “[b]ut as time passes, more and more of the ref-
erence products will be newer, and a biosimilar-product applicant, entitled to 
file an application a mere four years after licensure of the reference product, 
§ 262(k)(7)(B), can seek approval long before the 12-year exclusivity period is up”). 
132 Id. at 1063. 
133 Id. at 1064. 
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other remedies.134 The District Court’s grant of a preliminary in-
junction was affirmed.135 
C. District Court on Remand 
 On remand to the District Court, Amgen’s infringement 
claims against Apotex’s Neulasta biosimilar failed.136 The District 
Court found that Apotex did not infringe on Amgen’s patents.137 
However, the products have yet to be approved by the FDA.138 
IV. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE 180-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
 The 180-day notice requirement of (8)(A) is central to these 
decisions since both turned on the statutory interpretation of this 
requirement.139 However, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in these 
decisions is flawed and disregards the Congressional intent behind 
the BPCIA.140 The notice requirement should not apply to sub-
section (k) applicants who launch the “patent dance,” and the notice 
requirement should not extend the twelve-year exclusivity period.141 
A. 180-Day Notice Provision Applicability 
 These two Federal Circuit decisions revolve around statutory 
interpretations of the BPCIA, which could have larger implica-
tions on the biologics market and potentially deter the primary 
goal behind the BPCIA—to drive down the cost of biologic thera-
pies.142 The Federal Circuit held that the applicant is not required 
                                                                                                            
 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1066. 
136 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., Nos. 15-61631-CIV-COHN/SELTZER; 
15-62081-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13919, at *6 (S.D. 
Fla., Jan. 31, 2017). 
137 Id. at *11. 
138 See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note 32. 
139 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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to launch the “patent dance” and dispute resolution proceedings; 
however, regardless of whether the disclosure process was launched, 
the applicant is required to give notice of FDA-approval 180 days 
before marketing the product.143 The Federal Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of the 180-day notice provision in Amgen v. Apotex is flawed.144 
 The Federal Circuit reviewed the District Court’s interpreta-
tion of the statute de novo and reached the holding after looking 
at both the language of the statute and legislative history.145 
However, the court overemphasized the usual meaning of “shall” 
in (8)(A).146 Sub-subsection (8)(A) provides that “[t]he subsection 
(k) applicant shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor 
not later than 180 days before the date of the first commercial mar-
keting of the biological product licensed under subsection (k).”147 
 Typically, the word “shall” does indicate that the directive is 
mandatory.148 However, as the Federal Circuit explained in Amgen 
v. Sandoz, other language can force “shall” to not be a term of 
“enforceable compulsory obligation.”149 
 In Amgen v. Sandoz, the Federal Circuit interpreted the 
provision in (2)(A), which provides that “the subsection (k) applicant 
shall provide to the reference product sponsor a copy of the ap-
plication submitted to the Secretary under subsection (k) ....”150 
The court found that, when read in isolation, the “shall” provi-
sion appears to mean that the applicant is required to disclose 
and go through the “patent dance.”151 However, the court held 
that the provision “cannot be read in isolation.”152 Because other 
sections of the BPCIA contemplate that the applicant might choose 
                                                                                                            
 
143 Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1358. 
144 Contra Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
145 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1060–61, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
146 Contra id. at 1060–61. 
147 42 U.S.C.A § 262(l)(8)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017) (emphasis added). 
148 See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 123 S. Ct. 748, 769 (2003) (citing 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1598 (4th ed. 2000)). 
149 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
150 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(emphasis added). 
151 Id. at 1355. 
152 Id. 
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to withhold the information and, because it sets forth consequences 
for such actions, “‘shall’ ... does not mean ‘must.’”153 
 Similarly, “shall” in (8)(A) does not mean “must.”154 The Fed-
eral Circuit held that there was no statutory language that effec-
tively compelled a nonmandatory treatment of (8)(A) to dispose 
of Apotex’s argument; thus, (8)(A) was given its plain meaning 
to extend the exclusivity period.155 However, this interpretation 
is incorrect and would thwart the purpose of the BPCIA as a 
whole.156 A principle of statutory interpretation is that the plain 
language enjoys a robust presumption in its favor.157 However, 
precedent in case law states that “[i]t is a ‘fundamental canon of 
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read 
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statu-
tory scheme.’”158 Other parts of the statute indicate that “shall” 
is not mandatory in (8)(A).159 
 Similar to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Amgen v. Sandoz, 
another provision of the BPCIA anticipates and provides a remedy 
for failing to provide (8)(A) notice when the applicant followed 
disclosure procedures.160 Sub-subsection (9)(B) provides a remedy 
to the reference product sponsor in the event that the applicant 
chooses not to provide notice of commercial marketing.161 This 
remedy would be unnecessary if (8)(A) was mandatory for appli-
cants who are in compliance with (2)(A) and the subsequent 
disclosure requirements in subsections (l)(3) through (5).162 A 
                                                                                                            
 
153 Id. 
154 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(8)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
155 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
156 Interpreting (8)(A) by its plain meaning and a literal interpretation is 
incorrect. Contra id. 
157 See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982). 
158 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treas., 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). 
159 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(9)(B) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
160 See id. 
161 Id. (stating “[i]f a subsection (k) applicant fails to complete an action 
required for the subsection (k) applicant under ... paragraph (8)(A), the refer-
ence product sponsor ... may bring action under section 2201 of Title 28, for a 
declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceability of any patent included 
in the list described in paragraph (3)(A) ...”). 
162 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(2)–(8) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
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statute should not be construed so that a clause is superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.163 Therefore, the applicant may choose to 
not provide notice under (8)(A).164 
 Further, the Federal Circuit in Amgen v. Apotex held that the 
possibility of extending the exclusivity period would not counteract 
the purpose of the statutory scheme.165 Thus, the statute should 
not be interpreted in light of the facts at hand,166 but this creates 
an exclusivity windfall for the reference product sponsor, more 
specifically for Amgen in both of these cases.167 The twelve-year 
period was established as a “middle ground between innovator 
and generic interests.”168 The purpose of the BPCIA was not to 
preserve the market for reference product sponsors but, instead, 
to balance the interests of innovation and cost competition.169 This 
period was intended to be similar in scope and duration to the 
exclusivity afforded to innovative drugs by patent protection.170 
 Requiring 180 days of notice before commercial marketing, 
even when applicants launch the “patent dance,” would not promote 
the introduction of biosimilars and the interests of innovation.171 
This would deter the resolution of patent disputes, for which the 
requirement in (2)(A) was specifically included to expedite.172 
                                                                                                            
 
163 See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
164 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061–63 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
165 See id. 
166 See id. at 1062. 
167 Contra id. 
168 Krista H. Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biolog-
ics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 
817 (2010), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2010/01/an 
-unofficial-legislative-history-of-the-biologics-price-competition-and-innovation-act 
-of-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ2C-NM4B]. 
169 Lu, supra note 12, at 614. 
170 See Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8?9 (2009) (statement 
of the Honorable Anna G. Eshoo, a Representative in Congress from the State 
of California, sponsor of the Pathway for Biosimilars Act H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. 
2009). For biologics, Representative Eshoo’s bill would have maintained an ex-
clusivity period equivalent to the protections for small molecules under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. 
171 See generally Lu, supra note 12, at 629. 
172 Carver et al., supra note 168, at 813. 
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Further, it would not provide any benefit to the public or to the 
biosimilar market.173 
 This is not particular to the facts of this case as the Federal 
Circuit speculates.174 Rather, other biosimilar applicants may face 
this same situation.175 In Amgen Inc. v. Hospira Inc., Amgen as-
serted two patents involving Hospira’s biosimilar and both ex-
pired.176 This decision in Amgen v. Apotex will force Hospira to delay 
the commercial marketing by 180 days, even though the patents 
expired and Amgen has no exclusivity rights.177 This could continue 
to happen as more biosimilar applicants receive FDA-approval 
and attempt to enter the market.178 This decision will harm the 
public and produce anticompetitive effects.179 Thus, a windfall is 
created for the reference product sponsors, which is not supported 
by the plain language of the statute or the Congressional intent.180 
B. Purpose of the 180-Day Notice Requirement 
 The BPCIA parallels the Hatch-Waxman Act and its amend-
ments, which provided a statutory generic drug approval process 
and established the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) ap-
proval process by balancing public interests.181 The Hatch-Waxman 
Act was amended to include a 180-day exclusivity period, but not for 
the same interests as the provision in the BPCIA.182 The 
Hatch-Waxman Act was amended to incentivize challenging patents 
or designing around them;183 however, the 180-day requirement 
                                                                                                            
 
173 See generally Lu, supra note 12, at 633. 
174 Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 4. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 4. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 5. 
180 Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellants Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp., 
Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4225 (No. 16-1308), at 18. 
181 See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
182 Carver et al., supra note 168, at 816. 
183 The exclusivity period in the Hatch-Waxman Act will encourage manu-
facturers to design around the drugs, rather than filing for an ANDA, because they 
can avoid the exclusivity period. Id. 
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was implemented in the BPCIA to ensure that the “decision-making 
regarding further patent litigation is not conducted under time 
pressure that will impair its fairness and accuracy.”184 
 As opposed to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the reference product 
sponsor is already incentivized to challenge the patents when they 
receive (2)(A) notice, and the notice of applying for FDA-approval 
under (2)(A) should provide the reference product sponsor with 
adequate notice to prepare for litigation.185 The Federal Circuit 
rested the decision on theoretical concerns over a “race to [the] 
court”; however, a “race to [the] court” is unlikely to occur as this 
case shows.186 
 Amgen became aware of Apotex’s intention to market its 
biosimilar when Apotex provided both pre-licensure notice of 
commercial marketing and disclosure information pursuant to 
the requirement in (2)(A), and as a result, Amgen was able to take 
the steps to protect its legal rights.187 All the information Amgen 
needed to protect the rights held in its patents was disclosed 
under (2)(A).188 After disclosure under (2)(A), the reference sponsor 
should be able to generate a list of patents for which it believes a 
claim of infringement could be asserted under subsection 
(l)(3)(A).189 Here, Amgen had eleven months to review the bio-
similar application and manufacturing information.190 No statutory 
purpose would be served by delaying the launch of the biosimilar 
product by another six months.191 
 The Federal Circuit asserted that this will become less of 
a problem as time goes by, but this reasoning is flawed as well.192 
                                                                                                            
 
184 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
185 Contra id. 
186 See id. at 1065. 
187 Id. at 1059. 
188 Id. 
189 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(3)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017) (stating that 
subject to this subsection, “the reference product sponsor shall provide ... a 
list of patents for which the reference product sponsor believes a claim of 
patent infringement reasonably could be asserted ...”). 
190 Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellants Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp., 
Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4225 (No. 16-1308), 
at 29. 
191 Id. at 29–30. 
192 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061–62 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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The Federal Circuit stated that they “have been pointed to no 
reason that the FDA may not issue a license before the 11.5-year 
mark and deem the license to take effect on the 12-year date”193 
but there is no basis for this statement.194 There is no policy by 
which the FDA could provide a license for the applicants prior to 
exhaustion of the exclusivity period.195 Rather, the BPCIA ex-
pressly states that an “approval of an application ... may not be 
made effective ... until the date that is [twelve] years after the 
date on which the reference product was first licensed ....”196 
 The BPCIA was drafted to allow biosimilar applicants to 
control the timing of the two stages of patent litigation.197 There-
fore, the applicants could choose to resolve any patent conflicts 
prior to the expiration of the twelve-year statutory period.198 How-
ever, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation requires any second-stage 
patent litigation to occur after licensure by the FDA.199 The dis-
pute resolution proceeding allows the applicant to choose to litigate 
the proceeding in either one or two stages.200 If all patents are 
not litigated immediately, notice under (8)(A) triggers the sec-
ond litigation, and again, the applicant can control the timing.201 
Therefore, the law allows the parties to litigate at the second 
stage post-licensure, but that is not required.202 If the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation holds, the applicant would be required to 
delay the potential second-stage litigation, which conflicts with 
the policy Congress intended to implement in the BPCIA.203 
                                                                                                            
 
193 Id. at 1062. 
194 Contra id. 
195 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k) (West 2015) (amended 2017). 
196 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017) (alteration in 
quotation). 
197 Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 8. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 9 (illustrating that under the statute, the Applicant can choose to 
litigate all listed patents in (3)–(5) at one stage, or may choose to narrow the initial 
dispute and resolve the remaining patents in a second stage of litigation). 
200 Id. at 8. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 9. 
203 The BPCIA intended for the applicant to control the timing of the liti-
gation. If the applicant is required to delay the litigation because of the notice 
requirement, the applicant loses that control. Id. at 8–9. 
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C. Preliminary Injunction as a Remedy 
 In both Amgen v. Sandoz and Amgen v. Apotex, Amgen 
sought injunctive remedies to enforce the 180-day notice re-
quirement of (8)(A).204 However, a preliminary injunction cannot 
enforce (8)(A) in either case.205 When an applicant fails to un-
dergo the disclosure procedures of (2)(A) and fails to provide 
notice under (8)(A), injunctive relief is not available for a failure 
to furnish notice under (2)(A).206 When the applicant fails to 
provide the information required by (2)(A), (9)(C) provides that 
the sponsor may bring suit on any relevant patent.207 That is the 
exclusive remedy.208 
 Instead, Amgen argued that it should be afforded the 
monetary and injunctive infringement remedies under the Pat-
ent Act.209 However, failing to provide notice under (8)(A) does 
not constitute an act of infringement, which is necessary to trig-
ger the injunctive remedies under the Patent Act.210 The BPCIA 
does provide for injunctive relief, but only if confidentiality rules 
are violated.211 The exclusive remedy for non-compliance is to 
immediately initiate an action for patent infringement.212 
 While Sandoz did not disclose as sub-subsection (2)(A) 
provides, Apotex followed the BPCIA provisions, but still failed 
to provide notice 180 days before commercial marketing.213 Amgen 
then sought a preliminary injunction seeking to force Apotex to 
comply, and the Federal Circuit granted this remedy.214 However, 
this holding is incorrect.215 If an applicant like Apotex participated 
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in the “patent dance,” but chose to not provide notice under (8)(A), 
the statute allows the sponsor to bring a declaratory injunction, 
not a preliminary injunction.216 If the applicant provided notice, 
the sponsor could bring a preliminary injunction under (8)(B), 
but those are not the facts here.217 
 A declaratory judgment is the express remedy Congress 
provides for failing to provide premarket notice.218 However, the 
Federal Circuit granted Amgen an “extra-statutory” remedy when it 
upheld the preliminary injunction to compel premarketing no-
tice.219 Congress did not expressly forbid any “extra-statutory” 
remedies, but “where a statute expressly provides a remedy, 
courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional reme-
dies.”220 Section 262(l)(8)(B) allows the sponsor to “‘seek a pre-
liminary injunction prohibiting the subsection (k) applicant from 
engaging in the commercial manufacture or sale of such biologi-
cal product’ based on any patent listed in the initial exchanges 
during the ‘patent dance’ but not selected for litigation.”221 
Therefore, Congress did not intend for the preliminary injunc-
tion remedy to always be available since (8)(B) applies when the 
applicant provided notice.222 Rather, (9)(B) provides the remedy 
for failure to comply with the notice requirement, and Amgen 
should have sought a declaratory judgment action.223 
V. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF CROSS-PETITIONS FOR 
CERTIORARI IN AMGEN V. SANDOZ 
 On December 12, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in Amgen v. Apotex, which clarified the Federal Circuit’s earlier 
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decision in Amgen v. Sandoz.224 However, on January 13, 2017, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the earlier decision and 
will decide on the issues presented in the cross-petitions.225 
A. Issues Presented in Sandoz’s Petition 
 Sandoz presented two issues in the petition for certiorari: 
(a) whether notice of commercial marketing under Subsection 
(l)(8)(A) is legally effective if it is given before Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval of the biosimilar application, 
and, if not, (b) whether Subsection (l)(8)(A) is a stand-alone 
requirement that may be enforced by means of an injunction 
that delays the marketing of the biosimilar until 180 days af-
ter FDA approval.226 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation in the case is incorrect.227 
Section 262(l)(8)(B) allows the applicant to provide the reference 
product sponsor with notice of commercial marketing 180 days be-
fore FDA-approval.228 It merely requires that notice is given “not 
later than 180 days before th[at] date.”229 The Federal Circuit 
overemphasized the word “licensed” in the phrase requiring that 
the notice must be given 180 days before “the date of the first 
commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under 
[subsection] (k).”230 Therefore, the Supreme Court should over-
turn the current interpretation of the notice requirement.231 
 Further, as discussed in Section IV.C of this Note, there is 
no private right of action for injunctive relief to enforce the re-
quirement in (8)(A).232 Rather, if proper notice is not given, the 
course contemplated by the BPCIA is to commence an action for 
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patent infringement.233 However, this issue would not affect the 
case on appeal because Sandoz has begun to market the product.234 
B. Issues Presented in Amgen’s Petition 
 Following Sandoz’s petition, Amgen filed a conditional 
cross-petition presenting the question of “[(a)] whether Subsec-
tion (l)(2)(A) creates a binding disclosure obligation that a court 
may enforce by injunction, or [(b)] whether the sponsor’s sole 
recourse for the applicant’s failure to disclose the information is 
the right, prescribed elsewhere in the BPCIA, to commence an 
intermediate action for patent infringement.”235 
 Like the argument in response to Sandoz’s petition, the 
BPCIA contemplates a course of action if the applicant chooses 
to forego the disclosure procedures in sub-subsection (2)(A).236 
(2)(A) poses a mandatory condition to invoke subsection 262(l)’s 
patent-dispute proceedings.237 An injunction is not available to 
compel compliance with the conditions set forth in the BPCIA.238 
Rather, the sponsor can file an infringement suit.239 Thus, in-
formation the reference product sponsor seeks may only be ob-
tained during discovery, not through a preliminary injunction.240 
C. Effect on Amgen v. Apotex 
 If the Supreme Court adopts the proposed stance on the 
issues in the cross-petitions, the holding in Amgen v. Apotex will 
be affected.241 Despite that Apotex has not given Amgen 180 
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days of notice before commercial marketing, Apotex effectively 
provided Amgen with notice of commercial marketing.242 Amgen 
would argue that Apotex has not provided Amgen with any “le-
gally effective” notice; however, the disclosure procedures in (2)(A) 
effectively provide notice to Amgen.243 This is notice that Apotex 
is seeking FDA-approval and, hence, that Apotex will soon begin 
to market the product.244 
 Further, the policy reasons for allowing notice 
pre-FDA-approval would support this stance.245 The BPCIA ad-
dressed “[t]he timing of biosimilars’ entry onto the market ....”246 
Because the BPCIA provides “exclusivity periods, it is particularly 
unlikely that Congress would have further delayed biosimilars’ 
marketing in such an indirect manner.”247 Apotex and Amgen com-
pleted the “patent dance,” and Apotex should not face the anti-
competitive effects of the Federal Circuit decision.248 
 In the decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the District 
Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for failing to provide 
180 days of notice before commercial marketing.249 Under the 
interpretation proposed above, the injunction is invalid. There is 
no cause of action “under which a sponsor could obtain injunc-
tive relief if the applicant fails to give notice” under (8)(A) if the 
applicant does not provide the information required by subsec-
tion (l)(2)(A).250 
 If the applicant discloses the information required by 
(l)(2)(A), (9)(B) permits a declaratory judgment action on a pat-
ent if the applicant “fails to complete” any of the several steps 
required by the statute, including (8)(A) notice.251 The Federal 
Circuit concluded that this is not the exclusive remedy because 
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(9)(B) states “that, in certain circumstances, the reference prod-
uct sponsor ‘may bring’ such an action,” and there is no language 
excluding other remedies.252 This holding is incorrect253 because 
the BPCIA expressly provides for an exclusive remedy, a declar-
atory judgment.254 Similar to the analysis of Amgen v. Sandoz 
where patent-litigation is the sole remedy for failure to comply 
with (l)(2)(A), a declaratory judgment is the sole remedy for fail-
ing to provide premarketing notice.255 Because the biosimilar 
product has yet to gain FDA-approval, the pending suit will not 
likely deter market entry if Apotex complies with the 180-day 
notice requirement after FDA-approval.256 
VI. EFFICACY OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND 
INNOVATION ACT 
 As stated above, the BPCIA was enacted to decrease the 
price of biologics while still promoting innovation and re-
search.257 However, like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the legislation 
the BPCIA was modeled after, there are problems within the 
BPCIA that need to be addressed to avoid unnecessary litiga-
tion, which has already occurred.258 
A. Foreseeable Problems Within the Statute 
 As discussed in Section I.B of this Note, the BPCIA cre-
ates a twelve-year exclusivity period for the reference drug and an 
exclusivity period for the first interchangeable biosimilar.259 These 
long exclusivity periods will likely inhibit the development of 
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biosimilars and interchangeables alike.260 The twelve-year ex-
clusivity period for the reference drug (before the first biosimilar 
can be approved) includes a four-year period of data exclusivity, 
which prohibits the filing of biosimilar applications.261 Similarly, 
the exclusivity period for the first interchangeable can range 
from twelve to forty-two months, again posing a barrier to mar-
ket entry for a biosimilar.262 In contrast to the BPCIA, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act provides only a five-year exclusivity period 
for new chemical drugs and a three-year exclusivity period for 
new chemical investigations of small-molecule drugs.263 These 
longer exclusivity periods will cause prices of both biosimilars 
and interchangeables to remain higher for a longer period of 
time, countering the goals behind the expedited process.264 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides exclusivity for a period 
of only 180 days following the first commercial marketing efforts 
from an applicant for the generic drug.265 This exclusivity period 
is half of the duration of the minimal exclusivity period for in-
terchangeables under the BPCIA. Some may believe that this 
difference will “provide a ... catalyst for competition, hastening the 
entry of additional [biologic] drugs to the market”266 because the 
Hatch-Waxman Act contained loopholes which allowed appli-
cants to prevent additional generics from entering the market.267 
The FDA implemented the exclusivity periods on a first-to-file 
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basis and, therefore, first applicants could toll this period by 
choosing to delay marketing of the product.268 In contrast, this 
“anticompetitive behavior” seems impossible under the BPCIA 
because the first interchangeable can either choose to not enter 
the market for eighteen months and accept payment or, in the 
alternative, not enter the market for forty-two months while patent 
litigation ensues.269 
 However, the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of 
the 180-day exclusivity period for biosimilars under the BPCIA 
allows this type of anticompetitive behavior.270 The twelve-year 
exclusivity period can be extended as the FDA cannot approve a 
biosimilar until the twelve-year exclusivity period is exhausted, 
extending the exclusivity period for six months.271 Because the 
notice provision triggers second-stage litigation and the appli-
cant cannot begin second-stage litigation until the applicant 
receives FDA-approval, the reference sponsor will not compete 
with the biosimilar until the litigation has commenced.272 
 This anticompetitive behavior counters the purpose of the 
BPCIA.273 Biosimilars will enter the market later and the reference 
product sponsor will not have more time to adjudicate patent rights 
without rushing to court.274 This effect will lessen the emergence 
of multiple biosimilars on top of the long exclusivity periods.275 
B. Biosimilar vs. Interchangeable 
 As discussed in Section I.A of this Note, a biosimilar product 
can be used interchangeably with the reference product, as an 
interchangeable, rather than biosimilar,276 if more safety standards 
are met.277 This means that the interchangeable product “can be 
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expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference 
product in any given patient ....”278 Additionally, 
if the biological product is administered more than once to an 
individual, the risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy of 
alternating or switching between the use of the biological prod-
uct and reference product is not greater than the risk of using 
the reference product without such alteration or switch.279 
 This is a very “difficult” classification to obtain in compar-
ison to biosimilarity.280 The FDA has not yet adopted regulations 
for determining interchangeability; however, it has distributed a 
guidance document as notice with opportunity to comment.281 The 
guidance document expressly states that the data and information 
needed to support interchangeability are “beyond that needed to 
demonstrate biosimilarity.”282 The document lists factors which 
determine the amount of data and information needed to support 
interchangeability as there are multiple influences which vary 
with the product.283 Additionally, the document concedes that cur-
rent analytical methodologies may not even determine or charac-
terize the relevant differences between the reference product and 
the interchangeable.284 
 This document alone shows that interchangeability will not 
be utilized by most biosimilar manufacturers.285 The trials and 
analyses would likely be unduly burdensome and costly,286 intensi-
fying the delayed emergence of biosimilars.287 Studies from other 
countries “with analogous biosimilar-interchangeable regulatory 
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systems further indicate that those seeking interchangeable 
approval are likely facing an uphill battle.”288 As of 2012, the 
European Medicines Agency, serving a similar role as the FDA 
in the European Union, had approved six biosimilars, but no in-
terchangeables.289 
 With chemical drugs, generic drugs can automatically be 
substituted by a pharmacist without physician approval, which 
allows the generic to gain market share more quickly.290 This 
trend continues as more generics enter the market, further pro-
moting competition and lowering the cost of pharmaceuticals.291 
However, biosimilars need to qualify as an interchangeable to 
receive this same automatic substitution.292 Therefore, the biosimi-
lar manufacturers cannot bypass the physician without undergo-
ing the additional burden of reaching interchangeable status.293 
Uncertainties about the interchangeables, in addition to increased 
marketing expenditures, would pose a greater burden on manu-
facturers.294 Few incentives would exist for the physicians to 
prescribe a new drug if there is a fear the patients may react 
differently to a critical method of treatment.295 Furthermore, 
state substitution laws for the interchangeables may not be as 
favorable as they are for pharmaceutical generics.296 In addition 
to the stricter standards, this would further discourage biosimi-
lar manufacturers from utilizing interchangeability.297 
C. Market Effects of the Abbreviated Approval Pathway 
 As explained above, provisions of the BPCIA detract from 
its statutory purposes.298 Few biosimilars will achieve inter-
changeability status and few biosimilars will enter the market 
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quickly to drive the cost of biologic therapies down.299 Statistics 
from the FDA support these conclusions.300 Since the implemen-
tation of the BPCIA, only four biosimilars have entered the market, 
and no biosimilars have achieved interchangeability.301 Notwith-
standing, the purposes of the BPCIA have been promoted by the 
few biosimilars that have entered the market.302 
 For example, Zarxio, a biosimilar to Amgen’s Neupogen 
product, subject of the litigation in Amgen v. Sandoz, received 
market approval on March 6, 2015.303 Less than a year later, 
Amgen reported that its year-on-year worldwide sales of Neupogen 
dropped 4 percent and full-year sales dropped 9 percent because 
of competition in the United States and unfavorable changes in 
foreign exchange rates.304 The revenue from Neupogen in the 
United States fell 11 percent in 2015.305 However, Zarxio was only 
sold at a 15 percent discount when it was first marketed.306 Some 
doctors may not feel that this saving is worth the risk, but as time 
goes on, this could “subside as biosimilar drugs become more com-
monplace.”307 
 After Zarxio kick-started the biosimilar movement, sales for 
Inflectra, the second biosimilar approved for sale in the United 
States, launched in November 2016308 at a 15 percent discount of 
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the reference product,309 hoping for the same success as Zarxio. 
However, the nature of this biologic could deter market growth.310 
 Oncologists in Europe had used the reference product for 
Zarxio for almost a decade before Zarxio was approved as a bio-
similar.311 The reference product for Inflectra has only been used 
for a couple of years.312 Rheumatologists and gastroenterologists 
may be more hesitant to uptake the product.313 Additionally, 
Inflectra was not tested in gastroenterology patients, but rheu-
matologists have much more clinical data to depend on, and thus, 
sales may not be curtailed.314 This puts Johnson & Johnson’s $5.9 
billion in projected sales of the reference product in 2017 at risk.315 
 Both Zarxio and Inflectra have entered the market de-
spite ongoing patent disputes.316 Launching the products before 
dispute resolution puts the manufacturers at risk for triple damages 
if they are found in violation of the patents.317 Manufacturers of the 
other two biosimilars have been hesitant to take this same risk.318 
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Sandoz’s Erelzi, a biosimilar for Enbrel, received FDA-approval 
in August 2016, but sales will not likely launch until mid-2017.319 
Amjevita, Amgen’s biosimilar to AbbVie’s Humira product, re-
ceived FDA-approval in September 2016; however, sales will not 
likely launch until 2018.320 These two products demonstrate that 
the need for innovation at a lower cost will not be met under the 
current judicial interpretation of the BPCIA.321 
 As indicated over the past four years and by the market data 
above, fewer biologics are expected to enter the market as bio-
similars due to the significant development costs.322 Biosimilars 
take around eight to ten years and $100–$250 million to develop, 
while generic small-molecule pharmaceuticals only cost around $5 
million.323 If manufacturers will have to face extended periods of 
litigation due to the Federal Circuit decision in Amgen v. Sandoz 
and delayed market entry after FDA-approval (and potentially 
triple damages if the products are found to be infringing), there 
are few incentives to pursue biosimilarity.324 The Supreme Court’s 
upcoming decision could potentially increase these incentives.325 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This Note disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s holdings in 
both Amgen v. Sandoz and Amgen v. Apotex.326 The BPCIA an-
ticipates that applicants will not go through the disclosure and 
information sharing process to minimize litigation and streamline 
disputes since the BPCIA provides a remedy to the reference 
product sponsor if the applicant fails to comply.327 However, if 
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applicants streamline this process, and do comply, the reference 
product sponsor effectively has notice of the potential marketa-
bility of the product.328 The 180-day notice provision should not 
apply to applicants who have disclosed pursuant to (2)(A).329 
 Furthermore, the BPCIA contemplates a course of action 
if the applicant chooses to forego the disclosure procedures in 
(2)(A).330 An injunction is not available to compel compliance 
with the procedures.331 Rather, the sponsor can file an infringe-
ment suit.332 Thus, information the reference product sponsor seeks 
may only be obtained during discovery, not through a prelimi-
nary injunction.333 
 Additionally, (8)(A) allows the applicant to provide the 
reference product sponsor with notice of commercial marketing 
180 days before FDA-approval.334 Section (8)(A) only requires that 
notice is given no later than 180 days before the date of commer-
cial marketing.335 Requiring the applicant to provide notice after 
FDA-approval would unnecessarily extend the exclusivity period 
for the reference product sponsor for six months,336 and the ap-
plicant would face anticompetitive effects.337 
 There is no private right of action for injunctive relief to 
enforce this requirement in (8)(A).338 If proper notice is not giv-
en, the course contemplated by the BPCIA is to commence an 
action for a declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceabil-
ity.339 Therefore, the Supreme Court should overturn the current 
interpretation of the notice requirement and the remedies for 
non-compliance in answering the cross-petitions for certiorari in 
Amgen v. Sandoz.340 
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 Like the Hatch-Waxman Act, there are imperfections that 
need to be resolved in the BPCIA.341 The 180-day notice re-
quirement is just one problem.342 This can extend the exclusivity 
period and delay generic entry into the market.343 Only four 
biosimilars have been approved by the FDA and no interchange-
able biologics have.344 Few manufacturers are likely to pursue 
interchangeability due to the higher safety requirements.345 How-
ever, biosimilars need to qualify as an interchangeable to receive 
the automatic substitutability as generic small-molecule drugs.346 
Few incentives exist for the physicians to prescribe a new drug if 
there is a fear the patients may react differently to a critical 
method of treatment that is only slightly less expensive.347 
 The market data of the two biosimilars that have entered 
the market indicate that biosimilars can reduce the cost of bio-
logic therapies.348 Under the current interpretation of the 180-day 
notice requirement and injunctive remedies, this will not happen 
quickly.349 Biosimilars are very costly to develop, and if manu-
facturers will have to face extended periods of litigation, delayed 
market entry, and potentially treble damages due to the Federal 
Circuit decision in Amgen v. Sandoz, there are few incentives to 
pursue biosimilarity.350 This decision is delaying litigation and 
the process of biosimilars.351 The case before the Supreme Court 
could increase these incentives and achieve the purpose behind 
the BPCIA, creating a market for generic biological therapies.352 
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EPILOGUE—THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN 
AMGEN V. SANDOZ 
 The Supreme Court announced its decision after the com-
pletion of this Note on June 12, 2017.353 As the Note argued, the 
Court held that section 262(l)(8)(A) allows the applicant to pro-
vide notice before receiving FDA approval, since “the phrase ‘of 
the biological product licensed under subsection (k)’ modifies 
‘commercial marketing’ rather than ‘notice ....’”354 Thus, the “bio-
similar must be ‘licensed’” when the product is marketed, not when 
notice is given.355 
 The Court further held that the requirement under (l)(2)(A) 
“is not enforceable by an injunction.”356 Rather, (l)(9)(C) provides 
the remedy when the applicant does not provide the application 
and manufacturing information required under (l)(2)(A).357 An 
“immediate declaratory-judgment action for artificial infringe-
ment” may be brought by “the sponsor, [ ] not the applicant.”358 
 However, the Supreme Court directed the Federal Circuit 
on remand to determine “whether an injunction is available un-
der state law to enforce” these requirements.359 Yet, Sandoz filed a 
statement at the Federal Circuit to remand the case to the district 
court, since the court would be faced with a question of state 
law.360 The case is still pending before the Federal Circuit.361 
 Nonetheless, this Supreme Court decision gives hope for a 
biosimilar market since it limits the exclusion period for the 
reference product.362 However, as the Note argues, this purpose 
                                                                                                            
 
353 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1664 (2017). 
354 Id. at 1668. 
355 Id. at 1667. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. at 1668. 
358 Id. at 1667–68. 
359 Id. at 1668. 
360 Amgen v. Sandoz: Sandoz Requests Remand to District Court, BIG MOLE-
CULE WATCH (June 30, 2017), https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/2017/06/30 
/sandoz-requests-remand/ [https://perma.cc/ZF7Q-MCR8]. 
361 See, e.g., The Biosimilars Council Supports Sandoz’s Preemption Position 
in Federal Circuit Amicus Brief, BIG MOLECULE WATCH (Sept. 15, 2017), https:// 
www.bigmoleculewatch.com/2017/09/15/biosimilars-council-supports-sandozs 
-preemption-position-federal-circuit-amicus-brief/ [https://perma.cc/6LW5-9DNS]. 
362 See Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1670. 
520 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:479 
could be furthered if applicants in compliance with (l)(2)(A) do 
not need to comply with the 180-day requirement at all, since 
the reference sponsor effectively has notice, but that holding is 
inconsistent with the current interpretation of the statute and 
the current state of the law.363 
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